The Middle East Institute (MEI) hosted an on-the-record briefing to discuss the highly volatile situation between Israel and Hezbollah across the Israeli-Lebanese border.
Speakers
Paul Salem
President and CEO, MEI
Randa Slim
Senior Fellow and Director of Conflict Resolution and Track II Dialogues Program
Transcript
The transcript below was generated automatically and may contain errors.
00:00:00:00 - 00:00:25:09
Thomas Halvorsen
Good morning and happy New Year, everyone. My name is Thomas Halvorsen and I'm the associate director for corporate and foundation relations at the Middle East Institute. I'd like to welcome you all to our 10th session in MEI’s virtual briefing series on the Israel-Hamas War, which will focus on the continued escalation on the Israel-Lebanon front. Since October, MEI has been working hard to provide you with cutting edge analysis on every dimension of the ongoing conflict.
00:00:25:11 - 00:00:49:04
Thomas Halvorsen
In the first three days of 2024, many developments have emerged that bring the region's future further into question. And we're very pleased to be continuing this important series in the New Year This morning, I'm delighted to welcome Dr. Paul Salem, President and CEO of the Middle East Institute, as well as Dr. Randa Slim, senior fellow and director for MEI’s Conflict Resolution and Track II Dialogues Program.
00:00:49:06 - 00:01:09:22
Thomas Halvorsen
Dr. Salem just returned from a trip to Lebanon before the New Year, and Dr. Slim is currently tuning in to this briefing from Beirut. Thank you both for agreeing to join us for a discussion on Lebanon, which comes at a particularly important time. When we get to the question and answer portion of today's briefing, you can indicate you would like to ask a question using the raise hand function in Zoom.
00:01:09:24 - 00:01:32:11
Thomas Halvorsen
Please keep your hand raised until I call and unmute you. State your name and affiliation and direct your question to one or both of our scholars on the call. Questions can also be submitted in writing via the Q&A chat box on Zoom. Before we get to that, however, I'd first like to turn to you, Paul and Randa, and invite you both to provide our listeners with a better understanding of the situation at hand.
00:01:32:13 - 00:01:56:06
Thomas Halvorsen
There's been skirmishes and fire exchanged along the Israel-Lebanon border ever since October 7th. But the killing of Saleh al-Arouri earlier this week outside of Beirut was a significant escalation. Paul I was hoping you could begin by providing a bit of context for the violence we've seen along the Israel-Lebanon border these past three months. This war started as a war between Israel and Hamas.
00:01:56:08 - 00:02:15:02
Thomas Halvorsen
Why is that conflict in Gaza risking escalation into major conflict between Israel and Hezbollah? Also, what are Israel's objectives on its northern border? And have recent events, i.e. the killing of Saleh al-Arouri, indicated a notable new phase in Israeli policy?
00:02:15:04 - 00:02:42:22
Paul Salem
Well, thank you, Thomas, and it's great to see my colleague Dr. Randa, and I want to welcome everybody who's tuning in today, friends of MEI, to this briefing. And I want to wish everybody a happy New Year, despite the difficult situation in the region we cover in the Middle East. Yeah, to provide some important context. Or the relationship basically between Hezbollah and Israel.
00:02:42:24 - 00:03:24:13
Paul Salem
This has been a conflict that's now 40 years old from the early 1980s, and there's been battles between Hezbollah and Israel in many phases. This led to an Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon in the year 2000. Then there was a major war between Hezbollah and Israel in 2006, which ended with a negotiated agreement that the U.N. 1701 agreement, which supposedly governed the security arrangements and maintained largely maintained peace and stability across the Israeli-Lebanese border since 2006.
00:03:24:15 - 00:03:59:07
Paul Salem
The attacks of Hamas on Israel in October seven and then the massive Israeli retaliation on Gaza has sparked an enormous amount of escalation. The biggest, certainly we've seen since the war in 2006. And that's been a sort of tit for tat attacks across the border for the last many weeks. The highest point really occurred with the assassination of the senior Hamas official, Mr. al-Arouri, in Beirut in the southern suburbs this Tuesday.
00:03:59:07 - 00:04:25:12
Paul Salem
And that has really created a higher level of escalation. Hezbollah’s relationship with Hamas, I would say, has been highly cold. Hamas certainly has built over the years a relationship with Hezbollah and with Iran that's many years old. But it's also important to note that Hamas was on the opposing side of the war in Syria, fighting against Hezbollah and other Iranian proxies.
00:04:25:12 - 00:04:56:18
Paul Salem
So there was a period there when they were enemies, but certainly they are allies again. Hezbollah is really the, you know, the proxy force or a group very close to Iran, which perfected and gained experience in fighting Israel, and how this form of asymmetric warfare can be achieved. Clearly, a lot of those lessons that Hezbollah learned were transferred to Hamas and Hamas use to great effect in its attacks of October seven.
00:04:56:19 - 00:05:21:17
Paul Salem
So there is that relationship there. Since October seven, Hezbollah has maintained a limited amount of escalation across the border with Israel, with the stated aim of pinning down a number of IDF forces in northern Israel in order to relieve Hamas, as it were, in Gaza, but is also pointedly not fully joined the war and not fully opened a second front.
00:05:21:17 - 00:05:53:00
Paul Salem
So trying to tread a middle line there. Israel for your second question, and I'll end with that. Israel, according to reports recently after the Hamas attacks of October seven, was considering apparently a preemptive attack on Hezbollah in Lebanon as a first move before a major attack on Gaza. Apparently, the US talked them down from that and for a number of weeks that seemed to be off the agenda.
00:05:53:02 - 00:06:19:00
Paul Salem
But a number of weeks ago, Israel once again brought up the issue of its northern border and of Hezbollah as presence close to its border as a priority. And has raised demands that it wants Hezbollah fighters to withdraw from that border area. It wants to bring back the inhabitants of its northern towns to northern Israel. It's what it wants, sort of a new set of arrangements, as it were.
00:06:19:02 - 00:06:32:20
Paul Salem
And that's and it's threatening that if that is not achieved through diplomacy, then Israel might be willing to use military means. That’s, in brief, where we are today. Thank you, Thomas.
00:06:32:22 - 00:06:54:19
Thomas Halvorsen
Great. Thanks so much, Paul. And obviously there'll be more discussion in the second half of this briefing on on some of the points that you raise right there. Now, I'd like to turn to Dr. Slim. Randa, could you provide us any further insight into the perspective from Lebanon being in Beirut right now? Could you tell us what has Hezbollah's strategy been towards Israel since October 7th?
00:06:54:21 - 00:07:01:23
Thomas Halvorsen
And how are people in Lebanon reacting to the recent killing of Saleh al-Arouri?
00:07:02:00 - 00:07:30:11
Randa Slim
Good morning, everyone, and thank you, Thomas, and good to share this briefing with my colleague, Dr. Salem. You know, let me start. I arrived here December 12 and and what struck me when I came and until like two days ago, is that there are two Lebanon's there is one Lebanon that is involved in the fight in with Israel in the south.
00:07:30:13 - 00:07:54:18
Randa Slim
That is an active war front there. It's not like the war like Gaza, but anywhere from 5 to 10 people are dying on a daily basis, mostly Hezbollah fighters, but also some civilians have died. So that's one Lebanon that is there. And then there is the rest of Lebanon that is basically was busy with Christmas, going to cafes.
00:07:54:18 - 00:08:17:08
Randa Slim
Restaurants are full. And rarely does what's happening in the South come up in conversation with people throughout this other part of Lebanon. And I think what happened with the assassination is that it's brought these two Lebanon’s together. It's reminded the people who are living in this Lebanon that did not want to think about what was going on in the south.
00:08:17:10 - 00:08:35:20
Randa Slim
It reminded them that there is really a war and is going to have it's affecting them. And it might hit them. You know, it might in a way. It might involve their capital, it might involve their homes. It might involve their streets. And I think since then, the tenor of the conversation, at least since the assassination, has changed.
00:08:35:22 - 00:08:59:10
Randa Slim
There's no fear. There's concern that's shared throughout the country about what are going to be the next steps. I think after. I mean, there is now more talk like today I was out with with some people and there is more talk of them of people leaving the country again. There are people who left the country after October eight, came back for the holidays and were planning to stay here.
00:08:59:16 - 00:09:23:09
Randa Slim
And now they are packing their bags and leaving again. These are Lebanese. These are not foreign expats who have been asked by or who have been advised by their embassies to leave. These are Lebanese who have homes abroad who can afford to live in more than one place. And so there is this fear. And then, you know, there is this fear that this war is now getting close and and that is more concerned about that.
00:09:23:14 - 00:10:10:09
Randa Slim
So this is the tenor right now in the country. It's fear, it's concern, it's worry. And Nasrallah's speech. Yes, I think yesterday, yeah. Did not much to alleviate this. I think people read people read in the rhetoric like it pushed a rush to war. Whereas if you look at his speech and you compare it to previous speeches since October eight, there's really not much I mean, there is definitely rhetorical escalation because of the Arouri assassination, because of what happened in command a few hours before the speech, because of Mousavi's Radi Mousavi's assassination in Damascus late December, which is a big blow for the Iran resistance axis, including Hezbollah.
00:10:10:11 - 00:10:34:05
Randa Slim
I think yesterday was basically saying, you know, we are not going to push into war, we are not going to be baited into a war in all out war by Israel. We are going. And he said at one point, we are losing so many fighters in in the south because we we are conducting this war with Israel, meaning Hezbollah with very carefully, he said.
00:10:34:05 - 00:11:01:03
Randa Slim
I think he said we are making very balanced judgment of what we can do and what we cannot do. So escalation is, you know, is incremental, is proportionate because they don't want to be dragged into into a war. And I think Hezbollah is really facing a dilemma. You know, I think they entered this war in October 8th, as he put it yesterday, out of sense of support for the people of Gaza.
00:11:01:05 - 00:11:23:07
Randa Slim
But at the same time, he again, he said that yesterday, we have been taking into consideration into our approach to this war, taking into consideration the situation in Lebanon, the fear in Lebanon. I mean, when you travel around Lebanon, everywhere, there are these big signs, you know, with hashtag in Arabic, “we do not want war.”
00:11:23:13 - 00:11:47:05
Randa Slim
And I think Hezbollah is very much cognizant of this mood that is prevailing in the country that, you know, war is the last thing that people who have been suffering from economic, you know, bad economic condition want. So I think what I got from the speech yesterday is, one, they they do not want to be dragged into this war that will go into this all out war, only forced by Israel.
00:11:47:10 - 00:12:10:08
Randa Slim
But they are not going to do anything to give Israel the reason to basically declare an all out war. And so I think the response as he put it, to worry, which based on, you know, building on the statement that that Hezbollah issued right after the assassination, that there will be a response, that this assassination will not go unpunished, mostly because it happened in Dahiyeh.
00:12:10:08 - 00:12:36:18
Randa Slim
Look, if Saleh al-Arouri was assassinated in south Lebanon, you know, that would be considered as part of this front. You know, this is warfare and it's happening. And people commanders get killed, you know, even if they are attacked by drones. But the fact that he was hit in an apartment on Hadi Nasrallah, of all the streets, you know, that they can hit him on the symbolism.
00:12:36:23 - 00:13:07:11
Randa Slim
The son, the late son of of Hassan Nasrallah inside Hezbollah’s security perimeter. I don't know how many of you have been to that area. It's highly congested area. But at the same time, you know, it's an area where Hezbollah people live, where Hezbollah commanders live, where Hezbollah leadership lives, where Hezbollah have many offices throughout that area. And so I think the fact that they were hit there for Hezbollah, this has crossed a red line.
00:13:07:11 - 00:13:33:19
Randa Slim
You know that, you know, we fight each other, you and us, Israel, in in the south. And with me, we can expand that a front every now and then by a few kilometers. But we stick to that region, to that border region. By Israel deciding to come and attacking in the southern suburb on Hadi Nasrallah Blvd is basically a red line for Hezbollah, which they would like, if possible, to make it a one-off hit.
00:13:33:21 - 00:13:57:18
Randa Slim
You know, they want to make it costly enough. The response has to be costly enough for Israel in a way to deter Israel from doing this again against other Hezbollah. I mean, Hamas commanders who live you know, many of them live in that area because they live under Hezbollah's protection in that area. So this is I think they are stuck in continuing with this.
00:13:57:21 - 00:14:29:08
Randa Slim
They are stuck with with with the responding to this assassination. They are trying to back to balance their response. They will be trying to balance their response in a way not to give Israel the reason to to to, you know, get dragged them into a larger war. And and I think they are going to continue as is. And based on the speech, their belief is that, you know, Israel is not winning, is not achieving its objectives in Gaza stated objectives in Gaza.
00:14:29:10 - 00:15:01:07
Randa Slim
And that you know, it's it's it's it's likely to be hitting or trying to seek like this objective meaning Hamas killing Hamas leaders in other locations like Lebanon. Amos Hochstein is coming to the region. How does this affect his diplomatic efforts to de-escalate between Lebanon and Israel? I think it really derails it. I think this is not something that that will facilitate that effort, will stop it.
00:15:01:09 - 00:15:22:09
Randa Slim
I mean, will it bring will put a veto from Hezbollah side on this effort? I don't know. It's early to tell, but I think it would be it would be It definitely it's a complicating factor in this task that the U.S. is trying to do in de-escalating the conflict between Hezbollah and Israel. I'll stop at this point.
00:15:22:11 - 00:15:41:17
Thomas Halvorsen
Great. Thank you so much, Randa. Lots to discuss here now, now that we've had an opportunity to hear a brief word from both our guests, I'd like to open up the discussion to all of you to ask a question again. Please use the raise hand function on Zoom and keep your hand raised until I call and unmute you.
00:15:41:19 - 00:15:59:17
Thomas Halvorsen
Then kindly state your name and affiliation and direct your question to one or both of our scholars on the call. Questions can also be submitted using the Q&A chat box on Zoom. I see we already have a question here from Ellen Knickmeyer, so I'll I'll ask her to present the question.
00:15:59:19 - 00:16:48:09
Ellen Knickmeyer (Assoicated Press)
Hi there. Thank you very much for doing this. And Dr. Randa Slim, you mentioned that Hezbollah knows that it doesn't necessarily have the support of the Lebanese population for any escalation. I wondered if you could talk about just other factors that it's considering as it weighs it escalating and joining in in the escalation? And and if it if you all feel like you can speak more broadly for all the combatants in the region that are on that point, are all the combatants in the region, including, you know, the Houthis and the groups in Iraq and and elsewhere?
00:16:48:14 - 00:16:54:20
Ellen Knickmeyer (Assoicated Press)
That would be great. But if you don't, then just on Hezbollah and Hamas would would be great. Thank you.
00:16:54:22 - 00:17:25:14
Randa Slim
This is a very good question. Look, I think well, I mean, again, what Hezbollah thinks is, is I mean, very few people are privy to what Hezbollah thinks or deliberates at any point in time. And so it's and that's why it's important to you know, basically take what he said yesterday and he's going to give a speech tomorrow, again, by the way, focusing on, he said, the Lebanese situation.
00:17:25:16 - 00:18:11:06
Randa Slim
I what are other factors? I think that that are going into their their their consideration. I think from the beginning I have said that Hezbollah and and the whole resistance group or network has basically is now at a stage where as a group, they have they have come to the decision for some time now, even when Soleimani was still alive, that they are not going to allow any member in that network to be basically, let's say, liquidated.
00:18:11:08 - 00:18:40:10
Randa Slim
And so when Bashar al Assad face this major crisis in in 2011, 2012, it was not a question for them not to get involved to help him out, especially once they have decided that he might have been I mean, he faced the chance of of of basically losing the regime, losing control. And I think in the beginning, if you remember, they took their time to get involved.
00:18:40:10 - 00:19:12:12
Randa Slim
But then once they decided that he was facing a real crisis, then they went all in. I think in the case of Hamas, it's something different. I mean, they cannot go all the way in inside Gaza. But I think what they are trying to do is to create this multiple front, as he put it yesterday. This is one way to help the people in Gaza you know, to basically make it costly for Israel and for the United States to continue to wage this war.
00:19:12:12 - 00:19:58:10
Randa Slim
And because this is their strategy. And so I don't see them being deterred in any way by any American intervention, be it like what happened today, killing one of the Harakat al-Nujaba commander in the middle of Baghdad in daylight or killing Saleh al-Arouri again in the middle of Dahiyeh, or killing anybody in the future. I think this is a strategic decision made by the whole network as such, including Tehran, that any member of this network will not they will not allow any member in this network to basically lose power, to be kicked out, to be eliminated as as as Israel has declared at the outset of the war, as its objective to
00:19:58:10 - 00:20:22:09
Randa Slim
eliminate Hamas. Once that objective was declared by Israel, which is new compared to previous wars that Israel had with Hamas, when that Israel's objective in the past was to deter and punish Hamas, never to eliminate Hamas. Now, whether this is achievable or not, that's another question. But once Israel declared that its objective is to eliminate Hamas, then that whole network kicked in gear.
00:20:22:11 - 00:20:41:13
Randa Slim
You know, and as he put it yesterday, they have really become a network. And he said it he explained it yesterday. He said part of the achievement of Suleimani when he was talking about Soleimani is that we we were a loose, we were a loose alliance. And what he did is he created a little solid network of us.
00:20:41:19 - 00:20:50:08
Randa Slim
And again, part of that network strategy is to prevent the elimination of any of its members.
00:20:50:10 - 00:20:55:21
Thomas Halvorsen
Great. Thank you so much Randa. Paul, I'd like to give you a chance to also chime in on this.
00:20:55:23 - 00:21:30:07
Paul Salem
Yeah, I mean, I've agreed with everything Dr. Slim said. That's important to keep in mind also for Hezbollah and some of these other groups. But Hezbollah, in particular, its main strategic function for Iran, is one of deterrence against any potential Israeli attack on Iran or American attack on Iran in the future. And that is one part of the consideration that that arsenal that Hezbollah has should not be wasted, should not be used easily.
00:21:30:07 - 00:22:12:10
Paul Salem
An alternative fights are alternative wars and that it needs to be maintained as that kind of deterrence is kind of an aircraft carrier park north of Israel while the U.S. has aircraft carriers certainly parked in the Mediterranean, but also close to Iran. The second consideration in Iran's contest contest with Israel is that this asymmetric warfare that Iran has supported, that Hezbollah perfected, that we've seen with the Houthis in Yemen with proxies or militias in Syria and Iraq, and certainly with Hamas, that vis a vis Israel.
00:22:12:12 - 00:22:47:13
Paul Salem
What Hamas was able to do on October seven shows that Iran's asymmetric warfare actually has strategic, you know, strategic superiority. If you you look at Israel and Iran, Israel is under attack. Israel is unsecure, whereas Iran isn’t. So I'm putting that in the context that while Hamas is very much obviously under threat, many, many things and certainly, you know, the slaughter of civilians, innocent civilians, first in Israel, then in Gaza, that is that's a terrible toll.
00:22:47:14 - 00:23:16:03
Paul Salem
But strategically, Iran is sitting sitting pretty, as it were, and hence doesn't need to do anything dramatic. It is kind of on the winning side of this. And and obviously, Israel is in a very strategic bind, but the United States as well is in a difficult situation in the Middle East. Public opinion in the region has shifted against the US in a major way because of its support of Israel in this conflict.
00:23:16:05 - 00:23:44:10
Paul Salem
The reemergence, sympathy for the Palestinian cause that all, you know, sort of goes in favor of the axis of resistance and all of that. And secondly, Iran has taken advantage of the situation to encourage its proxies in Iraq and Syria to a, to launch over now, I think 120 attacks on U.S. forces in the region. So there is a lot going on.
00:23:44:10 - 00:24:21:19
Paul Salem
I think Iran feels that they're in a fairly good place and that the network they've built is is you know, is having the upper hand, whereas Israel and the US are in a difficult situation. I think all of that logic militates against the necessity of Hezbollah escalating in a major way. But what we're not sure of is what Israeli calculations are, because what the Israeli the lesson that Israel learned was if Hamas could do what it did on October seven, then certainly Hezbollah could do much more if it wished to.
00:24:21:21 - 00:24:36:10
Paul Salem
And Israel is grappling with that with that threat and is no longer comfortable to just simply apparently just to simply coexist with it. And that's where the risk is. Thank you.
00:24:36:12 - 00:24:44:04
Thomas Halvorsen
Great. We're getting lots of questions in here. I have another one here from Kamal Shehadeh.
00:24:44:06 - 00:25:14:00
Kamal Shehadi
Yes. Hi. Thank you very much, Dr. Salem and Dr. Slim. I would love to hear more from both of you about the view. From Washington. And whether there's any development. In the thinking. About this. Typically, by this time, diplomacy would have kicked into full gear. There'd be various proposals for how you resolve this or that. Whether the south Lebanon. Or the Gaza. Wars.
00:25:14:02 - 00:25:44:08
Kamal Shehadi
And so, you know. We know very little about, you know, I mean, the actual diplomatic efforts other than trying to supposedly trying to restrain Israel from opening a northern front and limiting casualties in the south of the Gaza front, is there anything more in terms of diplomatic initiative, not just US directed, but the US and its friends and allies or any other level?
00:25:44:10 - 00:26:08:06
Paul Salem
Thank you. It's good to hear you, Dr. Shehadi. Kamal is a good friend. Thank you for that question. And I see a number of things and then certainly want to hear from Dr. Slim. First of all, the Gaza war has catapulted the Middle East and the Middle East issue two to almost top priority for the Biden administration.
00:26:08:06 - 00:26:45:04
Paul Salem
Part of that is the obvious geopolitical risk the war, the risk of it spreading, its potential impact on economics, on energy prices, you know, the usual geo political and geoeconomic risks. But also, as I think you've been following the handling initially of President Biden of this war has upended politics inside the U.S., has made a lot of young Democrats move away from the president, and the president is at risk of losing the presidential election later this year, possibly or partly because of the Israeli war on Gaza.
00:26:45:04 - 00:27:11:01
Paul Salem
So first thing to say is, is the administration is very, very busy and very focused on this issue before October seven. Yes, Ukraine and Russia and China had a lot of bandwidth, and the rest was domestic politics. But now the Middle East and this war is is is very top of mind. In Israel, Gaza, as you've seen, I mean, I think President Biden has put themselves in a bind.
00:27:11:03 - 00:27:44:14
Paul Salem
On the one hand, he embraced Netanyahu and said, we're with you and we agree with your war aim of a complete, you know, destroying Hamas, which is which is easier said than done, but then immediately realize that the civilian death toll is way more than it should be in any war. And the US president, US officials, US military officials have been urging, trying to convince Israeli leaders to wage the war differently.
00:27:44:16 - 00:28:09:09
Paul Salem
And the US has also been very active in trying to get more humanitarian aid into the Gaza Strip. But Israel has not been 100% responsive to that and the US is also looking for ways to end this phase of the Israeli war on Gaza and urging the Israelis to move to a different phase, which would be not large scale warfare but only targeted assassinations.
00:28:09:09 - 00:28:48:14
Paul Salem
Maybe similar to what we saw. Israel has responded saying, no, we will continue the large scale war. So really the US is is in a bind and you are able to impose its will or has not been able or willing to impose its will on Israel in its waging of the war on Gaza. As relates to Lebanon and as we've all seen or read, the US apparently talked Israel out of a preemptive strike on Lebanon right after the October seven attack and Israel, that is very significant and the US currently is definitely trying to talk both sides, the Israeli side and the Lebanese side.
00:28:48:16 - 00:29:13:00
Paul Salem
They don't have direct contact with Hezbollah, but they have indirect contact to urge both sides to avoid an escalation. Israel has demands on the border area, it wants Hezbollah fighters to fully withdraw from the area just next to the Israeli border. In principle, that would be in alignment with the UN Security Council Resolution 1701, which has never fully been implemented.
00:29:13:02 - 00:29:39:22
Paul Salem
Hezbollah has been reluctant to fully implement that, but Dr. Slim would know more about that than I would. But Israel has that particular demand and on the Lebanese side that demands that Israel not violate Lebanese airspace, not be attacking Lebanon, and certainly not be attacking Lebanese army positions. And the assassination of al-Arouri, as we've heard from Dr. Slim, just raises the stakes tremendously.
00:29:39:24 - 00:30:09:20
Paul Salem
Amos Hochstein, who is senior envoy from the U.S., who is the fellow who negotiated the Lebanese Israeli Maritime Agreement in 2022, which was a historic agreement, which effectively Hezbollah was indirectly a partner of. And that was a major achievement. So he's been back and he's coming back. He's currently in Israel, but likely to then visit Lebanon to provide crisis management and to manage this latest escalation without it breaking into outright war.
00:30:09:22 - 00:30:13:11
Paul Salem
Thank you. But I'm sure Dr. Slim might have much to add.
00:30:13:13 - 00:30:48:02
Randa Slim
Quickly, quickly. I mean, I agree with what Paul has said. There are two lines, two diplomatic tracks that are taking place right now. One is American led and the one is by the quintet, the five countries that are have been now involved in finding a solution to the political paralysis in Lebanon. And so the quintet has been focusing on two issues, primarily the election of a new president and, you know, the renewal of the mandate of the head of the army, which the latter happened.
00:30:48:02 - 00:31:29:10
Randa Slim
But the election of the new president is now hanging. And I think that is more and more obstacles to that. And within the quintet, Qatar has been playing a more of an active role than, for example, any of the other actors on this particular fight Then you have the negotiation that are taking place on 1701 implementation as a way, and America is seeing it as a way to avoid escalation between Lebanon and Israel, because Israel is saying the people who live in there, in the communities in the north are not going to be able to go back to those communities because they are afraid of what Paul said of Hezbollah doing something the same as
00:31:29:15 - 00:31:54:05
Randa Slim
the problem with 1701. As Paul said, it has never been implemented. You know, we has never we have never moved into a cease fire stage. It's still at the cessation of hostilities stage. And there are two problems that have been blocking the implementation of 1701. One is, you know, the presence of of Hezbollah in that border, you know, south of the Litani River.
00:31:54:07 - 00:32:22:20
Randa Slim
And the argument now that Hezbollah is making and they have made to the visiting officials based on people I have been speaking with here, is that there are no Hezbollah fighters in that area as such. You know, they are no, there is no Hezbollah military presence as especially what they were referring, because Israel has been focusing on these elite fighters who are in charge of the fight in Syria that are the one fighters.
00:32:22:22 - 00:32:47:07
Randa Slim
And the argument that Hezbollah has been making is, of course, they are fighting, but the argument they have been making that people who are doing the fight right now are local villagers. They are not Redwan fighters, they are local villagers. And supposedly this is part of the argument that was offered to the visiting minister of French, I mean, French minister, minister of foreign affairs when she was here at the end of the year prior in December.
00:32:47:09 - 00:33:05:16
Randa Slim
So that's one the second problem. And so that I don't see Hezbollah giving up on that. I mean, it's it's they are not going to give through diplomacy what they have not been able what what they are not going to give Israel through diplomacy, what Israel did not gain through war or what they did not lose in a war.
00:33:05:17 - 00:33:26:05
Randa Slim
And so they are not going to agree to that. It's going to be very hard for them to get them to agree to that. So the proposal now that I think Hochstein is bringing with him is this agreement on a point which is I call it point B, you know, which start in Naqoura and use it as the beginning of negotiation of this other contested points.
00:33:26:11 - 00:33:50:06
Randa Slim
There are supposedly 13 points of dispute in the land border between Lebanon and now a lot of them, about six of them have already been resolved by Satterfield when he was negotiating on the maritime border and the land border during the Trump administration. So many of these 13 points have already been settled. There are three or four that are highly contested and this does not cover the contested territories.
00:33:50:06 - 00:34:23:18
Randa Slim
Remember, 1701 does not cover the northern. The northern part of Ghajar does not cover it, does not cover Kfarchouba and does not cover Shebaa Farms because these are disputed territories. They are not part of 1701. And so the idea is that so that's that's the proposal I think that talks is going to come and already you are hearing in many Hezbollah outlets that it's going to be very that that that mission by hook scene is is already dead after Arouri’s assassination.
00:34:23:20 - 00:34:51:16
Randa Slim
The negotiation, I have to say, on the Lebanese part with Hochstein has been led or has been delegated by Hezbollah, who is going to be the main decision maker on this issue, to bury the speaker of the parliament and to absorb the deputy speaker who leads these negotiations one on one with Hochstein. But at least the mood right now since Arouri’s assassination is that those negotiations are not going to go forward.
00:34:51:17 - 00:35:11:23
Thomas Halvorsen
Great. Thank you both so much. It looks like Randa just dropped a little bit. As I said, she's tuning in from Beirut, so hopefully she'll be back up. There she is. All right. I have another question here in the chat from Rafiq Latta. He says a few hours ago, there have been reports that Hezbollah has withdrawn a few kilometers back from the Israeli border.
00:35:12:00 - 00:35:26:08
Thomas Halvorsen
Can you confirm if this is true and is there any significance in it at all? I see Randa shaking her head. Perhaps she wants to go first. And Paula, you can chime in after she's dropped again. So, Paul, why don't you take this and then when she gets back, we'll we'll go back to her on that.
00:35:26:10 - 00:35:30:07
Randa Slim
Yeah. Problems, Internet. Yes.
00:35:30:09 - 00:35:33:00
Thomas Halvorsen
No problem. Randa, do you want to take that question first? Now that you're back.
00:35:33:05 - 00:35:53:02
Randa Slim
I know I heard the same news. I heard the same news. I don't know. No, I cannot confirm. I cannot. I have not been to the South. No, I mean, recently, at least since September. And. No, I don't know. I haven't spoken with anybody who might shed some light on this issue. No.
00:35:53:03 - 00:36:28:12
Thomas Halvorsen
Great. Paul, anything you want to add at all or no comment? Yeah. All right. Thank you both. We have another question here in the chat from Robert Share. This is, if I understand correctly, the Iranian, the Iranian proxy network cannot accept the elimination of any of its components, something that Randa said. What do you think they are willing to do, slash risk along those lines, given that it seems clear at this moment that Israel's committed to eliminate eliminating Hamas, it seems that this would lead to a much larger conflict that no one claims to want.
00:36:28:14 - 00:37:01:12
Paul Salem
If I may comment on that, but I would like Randa’s views as well, because it is the case that Hamas is maybe not on the brink of extinction, but it's certainly on the brink of major setbacks, Major degradation, major defeat, unlikely to be able to be in Gaza in the foreseeable future. And certainly, you know, the suffering of the Palestinian people has been the biggest since 1948.
00:37:01:14 - 00:37:30:24
Paul Salem
So I think, you know, there has been perforce a distinction between how Iran intervened in Syria because, first of all, they could as Randa said the geography obviously is different. They have direct access to Syria through Iraq. Hezbollah has direct access to Syria from Lebanon. And the Assad regime was a major not just important in itself, but a major conduit to Hezbollah.
00:37:30:24 - 00:37:56:15
Paul Salem
And without the Assad regime, it was Hezbollah. So there was much more on the line. And it's you know, it seems to be the case that, you know, Hamas is being effectively defeated to a large degree, maybe not 100%, but, you know, 90%, 80%, whatever it is. And think the limit of the Iranian response, well, it's been limited that, you know, they will escalate.
00:37:56:15 - 00:38:28:12
Paul Salem
They've, you know, bomb things in the Red Sea. They're attacking U.S. forces. So they are doing significant things. But Hamas is largely going under. So there might be a distinction there among these different allies of of Iran. And keep in mind, you know, also that Hamas is not a tight ally as much as Hezbollah and others were, as we said, as Hamas was fighting against Iran and against Hezbollah for many years in Syria.
00:38:28:14 - 00:38:52:14
Paul Salem
But also the geography is quite different. And that, as I said previously, Iran strategically is winning, is gaining from this, even though, you know, Hamas is losing, public opinion is shifting, the US is suffering. Israel suffered a major blow. So maybe the calculations are a little bit different, but certainly something to watch.
00:38:52:14 - 00:39:26:03
Randa Slim
I hate to disagree with Paul. I think I mean, Hamas is still far off from being eliminated and I don't think that objective is achievable. Elimination of Hamas leaders. Yes. And we have seen Israel go after PLO leaders after the Munich massacre. And I think they are going to live up to their promise to the Israeli people of going after every Hamas leader who was involved or Palestinian Islamic Jihad if they were involved as well in the attack on October seven.
00:39:26:03 - 00:39:56:13
Randa Slim
And they have started doing that. So and, you know, and they might take years and years to eliminate all of those who are involved. Hamas popularity is on the increase in the West Bank, where it has not been too popular in the past. Hamas popularity is on the increase in the region. So as an organization, it might be difficult, yes, logistically to govern Gaza in the future, depending on also what is the agreement, you know, how this war ends and what kind of agreements.
00:39:56:13 - 00:40:28:10
Randa Slim
But Hamas as an ideology, Hamas as a movement has shown in the past its resilience to survive after the elimination, even of its founder, after the elimination of many of its leaders. And these movements, whether it's Hezbollah or whether it's Hamas or whether it is the Iraqi militias, are very resilient organizations. You know, they have multiple, you know, although sometimes they are hierarchical.
00:40:28:12 - 00:41:03:24
Randa Slim
But for example, when Nasrallah’s predecessor was eliminated, you know, Nasrallah came in and you have even more potent, if we can put it this way, leader of of Hezbollah. And so it's hard to really gauge. You know, every time I listen to Hezbollah leaders, I listen to even, you know, some of their constituents. So, you know, it's very hard for us sitting in the West to understand how to really appreciate how resilient and how willing to sacrifice people are for a cause.
00:41:03:24 - 00:41:15:10
Randa Slim
You know, I mean, it's hard for me. It is always hard. And yesterday I was talking with the Hezbollah. They said they are not defeated. Well, it's very hard to defeat these people. So let's stop here.
00:41:15:12 - 00:41:41:24
Thomas Halvorsen
Thank you, Randa for that. I have a question here from from Fadi Nicolas Nasr, talking about Resolution 1701, which you both commented on earlier and the details of it, but specifically, Fadi, asking what kind of international mechanism is needed to see and enforce a successful implementation of all the aspects of this resolution, like where can the U.S. start?
00:41:41:24 - 00:41:46:08
Thomas Halvorsen
What are the actionable items?
00:41:46:10 - 00:42:18:06
Randa Slim
The border points. The border points are the actual items, because once we settle that issue, then that whole claim that Hezbollah has of, you know, resistance is not totally eliminated, but it's weakened. So the border points. The second issue that I did not mention as 1701 states is the deployment of Lebanese army up to 15,000. I think, you know, soldiers in that area, which was to be vacated by Hezbollah.
00:42:18:06 - 00:42:39:22
Randa Slim
And the problem right now is that the army has an issue with personnel. They don't have 15,000 people to deploy. Let's say if the border points were solved tomorrow, can the Lebanese army deploy 15,000 soldiers tomorrow to that? No. I mean, commanders in the Lebanese army said we don't have enough people, you know, in fact, enough people are leaving the Lebanese army.
00:42:39:22 - 00:43:01:20
Randa Slim
They are having a hard time when they open up, you know, for people to join. They're having a hard time to recruit people to get them to join because of the low salaries and all of this. So that's going to be a big issue is the personnel. So so one of, the proposal is to, you know, give over this area more and more to UNIFIL, you know, which is going to be a lot to do and for you and to empower UNIFIL.
00:43:01:20 - 00:43:31:24
Randa Slim
I mean, the problem is UNIFIL mandate. Will it be empowered enough, you know, by by a divided Security Council to enable it to carry this task if we come to that step? So there are a lot of obstacles to do it. But the first actual item will be negotiations over the disputed over the contested border points. And as I said, there are not many left, four or five, but these are four or five tough ones.
00:43:32:01 - 00:43:34:04
Thomas Halvorsen
Paul, anything you'd like to add there?
00:43:34:06 - 00:44:09:09
Paul Salem
Just agree and underline. I mean, the point she made, the Lebanese army is remains sort of the only national institution that's still standing, but it's been extremely weakened by the collapse of the economy and pay and so on. It's, you know, bleeding people and bleeding capacity. So it's important to note that the US support for the Army, international support for the army, Arab support for the army generally, even, you know, putting 1701 is critical for Lebanon's stability and for Lebanon's ability to get through these various crises that it's going through.
00:44:09:09 - 00:44:39:11
Paul Salem
In addition, it is a critical factor of 1701 is to be reinforced. The second institutional point is 1701 was negotiated at a time in 2006 when there still was a UN Security Council. And as Randa indicated, effectively, we don't have a U.N. Security Council. It can no longer meet, can no longer make decisions because the US general, the US, France and Britain are on one side and Russia and China almost automatically are on the other.
00:44:39:11 - 00:45:14:04
Paul Salem
So and, you know, global governance has lost a particular lever there. So that's why it's ending up being American mediation with Israelis and Hezbollah. And then, you know, a bit of Qatar, a bit of France, a bit of this and that. It's left to diplomacy. But, you know, I think it's worth mentioning that the US, this administration has been very effective in deploying diplomats and resolving, for example, the maritime dispute, which was a historic achievement, and now working on the land border differences that still remain between Israel and Lebanon.
00:45:14:04 - 00:45:22:04
Paul Salem
So diplomacy works and we need more of it and I commend the US for still investing in it.
00:45:22:06 - 00:45:40:04
Thomas Halvorsen
That's great. Thank you both. That leads us to a question that I had for both of you. We haven't yet really touched in this briefing, but I was wondering if you could give some insight into the internal politics of Lebanon right now. Obviously, Hezbollah has significant power to move alone, but there are other political leaders within the country.
00:45:40:04 - 00:45:51:16
Thomas Halvorsen
And what role are they playing? What are the debates that they're having, especially as it relates to Israel, as things escalate, as tensions continue to rise between between both?
00:45:51:18 - 00:46:18:12
Paul Salem
Well, I'd love to hear from Randa She's there right now. But I mean, the context I would say this goes back to 2019 when there you could say there was a Lebanese uprising against the status quo, against the political class, against Hezbollah as part of that political class. This coincided with the collapse of the economy, the collapse of the of the money, the currency and the closure of the banks and all of that.
00:46:18:14 - 00:46:49:15
Paul Salem
And then that led to parliamentary elections where there has been an opposition bloc. It's a bit of a loose coalition, but it has had enough weight in parliament to be able to block the ability of Hezbollah and its allies to sort of automatically get their way in parliament. That is partly led to deadlock over the presidential election. For a while, there was deadlock over some other issues, like the extension of the head of.
00:46:49:15 - 00:47:32:08
Paul Salem
The central bank was not extended. There was a deadlock over the extension of the head of the Lebanese army. He was extended. So there has been a lot of dynamic politics. You know, gets complicated, but politics does exist currently in Lebanon and from people, you know, I saw when I was there or people I'm still in touch with, there is a concern among, let's say, some of the opposition that as war becomes the main headline and Hezbollah is the main player in the war, that that might make Hezbollah even more bolder or impose its will more, you know, more more brashly than it would otherwise.
00:47:32:10 - 00:47:58:02
Paul Salem
That hasn't necessarily happened yet, but certainly it is you know, there's concerns that I'm hearing that politics could transition into sort of wartime politics where Hezbollah pretty much holds all the cards, let alone if Hezbollah and Israel dragged the country back into another war. The economy is already devastated. What would that mean? It would take the country of a couple of decades even further back.
00:47:58:04 - 00:48:01:20
Paul Salem
But I'd love to hear from Randa, who is there right now.
00:48:01:22 - 00:48:50:15
Randa Slim
And quickly to add to what Paul said, I think, you know, the hands of Hezbollah’s opponents are basically limited. I mean, the negotiating positions are limited by what Israel is doing, unless there is quite a general sympathy in the country for the Palestinian people that transcends sectarian lines to transcend political lines and that is forcing leaders of groups that are well-known or parties to be opposed to Hezbollah and Hezbollah's unilateral power, I mean, sorry, power to unilaterally make war and peace decisions for Lebanon that is, in a way limiting their room for maneuvering, partly because of what Israel has been doing and continues to do in person.
00:48:50:17 - 00:49:21:22
Randa Slim
And so they are trying to navigate this terrain, you know, of basically saying, you know, you cannot take us to war while at the same time not appearing callous or not responsive to this mood, which is supportive of the Palestinian of the suffering of the Palestinians. And so, you know, and as Paul said, I mean, depending on how this war ends and Hezbollah will emerge, might emerge even stronger than it was before.
00:49:21:24 - 00:49:48:09
Randa Slim
And and that will create trouble going ahead. I have to say that there was a lot of analysis of linking implementation of 1701 to election of a president that's rule Hezbollah. I think this is totally wrong lens, a long approach because on issues, strategic decisions like a war with Israel, Hezbollah does not involve domestic politics at all in itself.
00:49:48:15 - 00:50:14:11
Randa Slim
Well, it might in this case, Nasrallah said. We take it into consideration. But when push comes to shove, you know, these strategic issues, any kind of domestic priorities. And so I don't think Hezbollah will try to bargain, you know, or negotiate implementation of 1701 versus electing, for example, somebody like Suleiman Frangieh, there was debate and some, you know, some expert analysis put out there about that.
00:50:14:13 - 00:50:35:17
Randa Slim
And I think that's definitely something that Hezbollah will never entertain, at least will not entertain as long as the war in Gaza continues. By the way, on on, on on the implementation of 1701, I have to stress that until now, Hezbollah has not said no, they have not said we have a veto or we are not going to do it.
00:50:35:19 - 00:50:47:23
Randa Slim
They just said everything will have to wait until the war in Gaza ends. Then they might say no, a hard no, or they might negotiate, as they have done with the maritime border.
00:50:48:00 - 00:51:04:06
Thomas Halvorsen
Right. Thank you both for that. And thank you both for your analysis throughout this entire briefing. I'd before we wrap up, I'd really just like to give you both the opportunity to give any final words you'd like that you haven't been able to say yet on on the situation at hand.
00:51:04:08 - 00:51:30:19
Paul Salem
Well, it may be worth talking a bit about the risk of a general escalation, a wider escalation. That's been a concern of certainly the US. It's been a concern of governments in the region, governments in the Gulf and others. And when escalation is talked about, they'd say first step of escalation would be Lebanon, and then maybe it risks getting into other arenas.
00:51:30:21 - 00:51:59:12
Paul Salem
When you talk about escalation in Lebanon, if there really were to happen, obviously that would have huge, devastating effects on Lebanon, the Lebanese people, Lebanese infrastructure, Lebanese economy, it would also have devastating consequences on Israel, Israeli civilians, Israeli infrastructure and Israeli economics. It might hit the offshore gas facilities of Israel, it might hit or affect certainly any potential exploration in the Lebanese offshore.
00:51:59:14 - 00:52:25:24
Paul Salem
So it would impact a bit the eastern Mediterranean gas situation. And if indeed Hezbollah, which is Iran's main sort of ally in the entire Middle East, is, you know, at major war, then we we we would worry about not only escalation in the Red Sea, which we've seen and which has already affected global shipping trade, caused a little bit of a spike in energy prices.
00:52:26:01 - 00:52:53:07
Paul Salem
But if any of that then is also transpiring in the Gulf itself, that could have tremendous impact, obviously, on Gulf economies, both Arab Gulf countries and Iran itself. But the global economy, energy prices and all of that. So where, you know, we're looking at Lebanon as sort of step two and a potential escalation, but one should be well aware that step two could lead to step three.
00:52:53:09 - 00:53:17:24
Paul Salem
It's important to note that Iran doesn't want that, the US doesn't want that, none of the players in the region want that. But the risk is there. And I think it's also important to note that the agreements between Saudi Arabia and Iran and the sort of normalization that's happened in the last couple of years between Arab Gulf countries and Iran has helped de-escalate, has helped keep the Gulf quiet.
00:53:17:24 - 00:53:41:05
Paul Salem
That's helped the conflict from escalating more rapidly in directions that would affect other countries. You see, the Houthis are used to be lobbing missiles at Saudi Arabia for many years now, are not doing that or lobbing things at the UAE either currently, not doing that. And that is partly because of the diplomacy that happened between the Arab Gulf countries and Iran itself.
00:53:41:05 - 00:53:45:06
Paul Salem
And that is holding. And that's a good thing.
00:53:45:08 - 00:54:09:09
Randa Slim
Quickly, I don't have much to add to what Paul said in terms of. But what struck me yesterday, listening to Nasrallah's speech is the specific emphasis he made on the Houthi attacks on the Red Sea. And partly, I think, because in that, I mean, it's not the Iraqi militia attacking us as that is more who is disrupting international commerce.
00:54:09:09 - 00:54:52:23
Randa Slim
And I think this is a feature, a new feature for this network. And so if I were to predict where is where Hezbollah will go next or if there is an escalation, I think they will seek to do same kind of disruptive acts in Israel that affect that has repercussions broadly, right. Not only on the Israeli economy. And so the gas platforms, you know, in the eastern Mediterranean is something that will fit within that same mode in terms of having not only on the Israeli economy, but also disruption of gas supplies in in in at the time when gas supplies are not in short.
00:54:53:03 - 00:55:24:04
Randa Slim
So I think that the emphasis you made and you really look, you know, mentioned it with lots of reverance just gives me an idea. I mean, just makes me think, given, you know, as somebody who has been following his speech for a very long time, you know, him going out of his way to point that that that makes me think this is an important dimension in their own thinking about how to wage warfare with Israel going forward.
00:55:24:06 - 00:55:47:14
Thomas Halvorsen
That's an excellent point. And obviously, Nasrallah has another speech tomorrow, so maybe we'll get more information from him then and we'll stay posted on this as it continues to develop. We're going to wrap it up there. But if you have any more questions, please email them to me at thalvorsen@mei.edu and I would be happy to send them to our experts here who would be happy to answer them at a later date.
00:55:47:16 - 00:56:18:12
Thomas Halvorsen
I hope you will join me in thanking both Dr. Salem and Dr. Slim for participating in this week's session on Lebanon. We really appreciate your insight and your willingness to share your morning with us. Before you go, I wanted to let you all know that just before the holiday we launched a landing page for our virtual briefing series where you can access all of our recorded briefing calls dating back to mid-October, You can find these recordings and transcripts at mei.edu/briefing-series.
00:56:23:18 - 00:56:37:19
Thomas Halvorsen
Thanks so much for joining us for our first briefing call of the New Year. Please be a look out for an invitation to next week's session, which we hope to distribute in the coming days. I wish you all the best day and thanks for sharing your morning with us.